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substantially affected. Protectionist countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development  (OECD)  (the  European  Union,  Japan,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Mexico  and  the 
United States) experience an import expansion or export reduction and significant contraction in 
production in unfettered markets. World beet production decreases by 21 percent by the end of 
the  decade,  whereas  world  cane  production  increases  by  8  percent.  Brazil,  Australia,  Cuba, 
Indonesia, and Turkey expand production when all distortions are removed. Aggregate world 
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1. Introduction 
The  current  world  sugar  market  situation  has  complex  North-South  and  South-South 
components. A myriad of policy interventions make sugar one of the most distorted commodity 
markets in the world. The European Union, Japan, and the United States are among the worst 
offenders in these markets. Producers in the United States receive between two and three times 
the  world  market  price  because  of  production  quotas,  import  controls,  and  government 
guaranteed prices. OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries’ 
support to their sugar producers amounted to about $5.3 billion in 2002 (OECD, 2003), roughly 
the value of developing-country sugar exports. In 2002, the European Union, the United States, 
and  Japan  provided  US$2.45  billion,  US$1.18  billion,  and  Jap$40  billion  of  annual  support 
(OECD, 2003). Such high protection has converted the European Union, a natural importer of 
sugar,  to  a  net  exporter  and  has  reduced  sugar  imports  to  the  United States  and  Japan  to  a 
fraction of free-trade levels. Further, most countries, including the lowest-cost producers, offer 
some form of protection or subsidies to their producers, and/or distort signals seen by consumers, 
and  often  impede  or  directly  distort  trade  in  some  fashion  with  restrictive  import  policies 
(Mitchell, 2003; OECD, 2003).  
  An  obvious  question  to  ask  is  what  unfettered  markets  would  look  like.  What 
consumption and production levels would prevail and what world price could be sustained in the 
absence of distortions? The latter question has  been a bone of  contention with producers in 
protected markets. The current world price is often referred to as the “world dump price” by 
sugar interests in OECD countries because a substantial share of world sugar trade occurs under 
preferential  agreements  (American  Sugar  Alliance,  2003).  Beyond  the  politics  of  sugar 
protectionism, the determination of an undistorted world price is a legitimate concern. There is   3 
no consensus on what this undistorted world price would look like. Partial-equilibrium estimates 
tend to be higher than those coming from computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies (van 
der  Mensbrugghe,  Beghin,  and  Mitchell,  2003).  Given  that  policies  and  market  conditions 
change  over  time,  a  useful  contribution  to  this  debate  is  to  provide  a  new  estimate  of  the 
undistorted world price of sugar. 
  Recent and interesting policy developments warrant a new analysis of the sugar market.  
Protectionist interests in the United States won a battle with the virtual exclusion of sugar in the 
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Despite this setback, the United States and the 
European Union will soon be forced to reform their sugar programs because of internal market 
changes and international commitments already made under NAFTA, the Everything-But-Arms 
(EBA) agreement, and minimum-market access commitments made under the Uruguay Round of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Further commitments are being negotiated under and the 
Free  Trade  Agreement  of  the  Americas  (FTAA),  and  the  latter  will  only  exacerbate  these 
pressures for reform. This is another case of border opening forcing domestic policy discipline, 
such  as  in  the  recent  reform  of  the  U.S.  peanut  program.  Needed  reforms  coincide  with 
scheduled reviews of the common agricultural policy (CAP) in 2006 and the expiring of the U.S. 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act in 2007 and provide a target period to get reforms in 
place. Would these reforms be more palatable under free trade with a higher world price? What 
is the effect of domestic farm policies relative to border barriers on world prices and markets? 
  Multilateral  trade  liberalization  erodes  benefits  and  market  access  from  preferential 
bilateral trade agreements and casts low-cost producers from Brazil and Thailand against less-
efficient producers in the South. For example, 9 of the 42 countries that hold U.S. quotas do not 
even produce the sugar they deliver under the quotas. Hence, sugar market liberalization has an   4 
important South-South dimension. How these reforms occur will have important consequences 
for developing countries. If world price effects are large, what is the net effect of removing one’s 
protection when it is combined with a substantial world price increase?  
  Most partial-equilibrium analyses of the sugar market analyze trade liberalization holding 
prices and policies constant in other markets. We depart from this approach and incorporate the 
impact of agricultural trade liberalization on prices for crops competing with sugar in land use. 
These free-trade prices come from a similar policy analysis carried out with companion models 
and using the same baseline of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) 
(FAPRI, 2002).  
  In the following paragraphs we summarize major policy interventions in world sugar 
markets. Then we briefly describe the international sugar model used for the simulations. After 
having introduced the policy reform scenarios, we present the results of our simulations. An 
Appendix  table  provides  further  detailed  information  on  the  results  country  by  country  for 
consumption and production.  We close with further reflection on what our results mean for 
global sugar policy reforms. 
 
2. Distortions in Sugar Markets 
Table 1 summarizes key current (as of 2002) distortions by countries covered in our analysis. 
Sugar markets are highly distorted in virtually all countries. OECD markets are by far the most 
distorted (OECD, 2003). But virtually all countries provide some sort of support to their sugar 
producers, including countries considered low-cost producers, such as Brazil (Mitchell, 2003). 
Several countries use tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and TRQ-like schemes to block imports 
with  prohibitive  duties on  out-of-quota  imports  (the  European  Union,  Japan,  and  the  United   5 
States). Many countries (Turkey, the Philippines) have no TRQs but have high tariffs on imports. 
Several countries (e.g., India, Egypt, and Colombia) provide domestic farm subsidies to their 
producers, either directly or through sugar processors who rebate them to farmers. In several 
countries  (e.g.,  Japan),  domestic  production  policies  are  in  fact  supported  by  trade  barriers. 
Closed borders reduce government outlays on farm programs, and sugar users and consumers 
effectively bear the cost of the production subsidies. To summarize the extent of distortions, 6o 
percent of trade in sugar and 80 percent of production takes place at prices above the world price 
(Mitchell, 2003). 
  
3. Structure of the CARD International Sugar Model 
The CARD
1 international sugar Model is a non-spatial, partial-equilibrium econometric world 
sugar model consisting of 29 countries/regions, including a Rest-of-the-World aggregate to close 
the model. The model is used to establish the sugar component of the FAPRI baseline (FAPRI, 
2003)  and  for  policy  analysis  (Beghin,  et  al.,  2003).  Major  sugar  producing,  exporting,  and 
importing countries are included in the CARD international sugar Model. The model specifies 
only raw sugar production, use, and trade between countries/regions and does not disaggregate 
refined trade from raw trade. Consequently, there is no category for importers as refiners or toll 
refiners because those countries that specialize in that role are well known and stable over time. 
Country  coverage  consists  of  the  following  countries/regions:  Algeria,  Argentina,  Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak 
Republics
2), Egypt, European Union-15, Former Soviet Union (FSU) (mainly Russia and the 
                                                 
1 CARD stands for Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University. 
2 Eastern Europe also includes Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and 
Slovenia.   6 
Ukraine
3),  India,  Indonesia,  Iran,  Japan,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, The United States, Venezuela, and a 
Rest-of-World aggregate. 
  The general structure of the country sub-model includes behavioral equations for area 
harvested,  yield, production for sugar beet and sugarcane on the supply side, and per capita 
consumption and ending stocks on the demand side. Equilibrium prices, quantities, and net trade 
are  determined  by  equating  excess  supply  and  excess  demand  across  countries  and  regions. 
Using price transmission equations, the domestic price of each country or region is linked with a 
representative world price (Caribbean f.o.b. price) through exchange rates and other price policy 
wedges such as tariffs and transfer-service margins. Because of the overall scope of the model, it 
is not feasible to include the complete empirical model in the text. The general framework for 
each country sub-model consists of the following: 
(1)  Planted area: AHt = f (AHt-1, RSPPt-1, RGPt-1, Trend), 
(2)  Yield: Yieldt= f (Yieldt-1, Trend), 
(3)  Cane and beet crop production: Productiont= AHt * Yieldt,  
with AH denoting acreage, RSPP being the cane or beet price, and RGP denoting the price of 
alternative crops. 
  Total  sugar  production  is  obtained  by  converting  beet  production  and  raw  cane 
production into raw sugar equivalent. Sugar consumption per capita is determined by the real 
price of sugar and income per capita: 
(4)  Per capita sugar consumption:  = f (RSP, PCRGDP),  
                                                 
3 The Former Soviet Union includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania),  Belarus,  Georgia,  Republic  of  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Republic of Uzbekistan.   7 
with RSP being the real consumer price of raw sugar, and PCRGDP representing real income per 
capita; total demand is just the product (population* per capita consumption). Inventory demand 
is 
(5)  Ending Stocks = f (ESt-1, SC, RSP),  
with ES representing ending stock, and SC denoting sugar consumption.  
  In many countries, the beet or cane prices are set by policy and can be treated as being 
predetermined. Some countries lack information on agricultural price and the raw cane sugar 
price, RSP, is used instead of the agricultural prices in the specification of the acreage response. 
In some countries, yield improvements are captured by a time trend. The excess demand (supply) 
of each country goes to the world market for raw sugar, and the sum of all excess demands and 
supplies is equal to zero by market clearing to determine the world market price.  
  The CARD international sugar model uses price transmission elasticities to link the world 
and domestic markets for each country. The price transmission equation assumes that agents in 
each country are price-takers in the world market. Countries are either a natural importer or 
exporter if their autarkic price falls above or below the world price. Net importers enjoy natural 
protection plus whatever barrier is set at the border. Abstracting from any spatial consideration 
and assuming an “ad valorem tariff only” regime, the domestic price can be expressed as 
(6)  P
d= α + β . P
w . r . (1+d), 
 
where  P
d  is  the  domestic  price,  P
w  is  the  world  price  of  sugar  including  international 
transportation cost if the country is an importer (f.o.b. price for exporters), r is the exchange rate, 
and d summarizes policy interventions between the world and domestic markets and is expressed 
in ad valorem form. Parameter α captures the divergence of the domestic and border price that 
does  not  depend  on  the  price  level  but  rather  reflects  transaction  costs  arising  between  the   8 
farmgate  and  the  market  place  and/or  marketing  markups.  Parameter  β  allows  imperfect 
transmission between world and domestic prices. Depending on data availability, domestic prices 
in the sugar model can be farm, wholesale, or retail prices. Because of the homogeneous nature 
of sugar, quality adjustments are not incorporated in the price transmission equations. In general, 
only one domestic price is used in the model. Consumer and producer prices are differentially 
specified only in countries that have a deficiency type of producer support or an explicit tax on 
consumption. 
  This general structure is slightly modified to accommodate policy interventions other 
than  price  distortions,  such  as  quantitative  restrictions  on  area,  supply,  or  trade  flows.  For 
example, imports constrained by binding TRQs are treated as exogenous, and domestic prices are 
solved endogenously. Policy interventions providing a price floor are treated as such and are 
effective whenever the domestic producer price falls to the price floor level (e.g., the U.S. loan 
rate).  This  mechanism  is  important  when  we  remove  trade  barriers  in  the  first  scenario  but 
maintain domestic farm policies.   
  The interaction with other model components used to establish the FAPRI baseline is 
limited to cross-price effects in supply (for wheat, rice, and soybeans). There are no links in 
consumption. 
  Data for area, yield, sugarcane, and sugar beet production were gathered from the Food 
and  Agricultural  Organization  (FAO)  of  the  United  Nations,  and  data  for  sugar  production, 
consumption, and ending stocks were obtained from PS&D View of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Cane and beet production is tied to sugar production through the extraction rate. 
Macroeconomic  data  such  as  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  consumer  price  index, 
population, and exchange rate were gathered from various sources, including the International   9 
Monetary Fund and WEFA-DRI.  
  Demand and supply price responses and income response of demand are econometric 
estimates or, when not available, consensus estimates. Their elasticity values are available from 
the  FAPRI  web  site  (http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/elasticity.aspx).  The  period  for  the 
econometric estimation is 1980 to 2001. Simple linear specifications and ordinary least squares 
are used in the estimation of these equations to save degrees of freedom, given the short time 
series used. This estimation approach treats sugar prices as exogenous for estimation purpose.  
  Elasticities in the CARD international sugar model are comparable to most existing ones 
(e.g., Devadoss and Kropf, 1996; Hafi, Connell, and Sturgiss, 1993; and Wohlgenant, 1999) and 
do not depart from the conventional wisdom on price-inelastic sugar markets.  The own-price 
elasticities of sugarcane supply are highly inelastic in the short run. This feature is consistent 
with  the  fact  that  several  annual  crops  can  be  harvested  from  one  planting  of  sugarcane. 
Therefore, there is limited acreage adjustment to price fluctuations in the short run. The own-
price supply elasticities for sugar beet production are generally not as inelastic as they are for 
sugarcane since beet is an annual crop. 
  On the demand side, the own-price and income elasticities reflect the fact that in many 
developing countries sugar is considered a staple in the diet. Consumers look to sugar to fulfill 
basic caloric requirements. 
  The Caribbean raw sugar price is generally considered to be the representative world 
market price. Sugar is a homogeneous commodity. The nominal world price of sugar has been 
increasing over time, although in a volatile fashion, while the real price has decreased.  
  Our analysis has some caveats, which are inherent to the radical nature of the policy 
reforms considered. The policy changes considered in the first two scenarios are drastic and   10 
imply large price changes and displacement of market equilibrium far from prevailing volume 
and prices. For example, our assumptions on supply curves underlying E.U. production quotas 
are based on consensus views on the relative competitiveness of the producers constrained by the 
quota. The exact shape of those supply curves is unknown. 
 
4. Scenarios 
We ran a sequence of three scenarios in deviation from the FAPRI baseline. We use the 2002 
baseline because it was used to carry the trade liberalization analysis in all other agricultural 
markets  (FAPRI,  2002).
4  The  first  scenario  removes  all  trade  distortions  (tariffs,  export 
taxes/subsidies, TRQs, and state trading). The second scenario considers the trade reforms of the 
first scenario plus the removal of domestic production subsidies and taxes. The last scenario 
considers the removal of all market interventions in trade and production, as well as consumption 
distortions.  In  each  scenario,  the  policy  reforms  are  fully  implemented  in  2002/03  and  their 
impact  is  measured  in  deviations  for  the  years  2002/03  to  2011-12. We  report these  annual 
impacts and the average of these annual changes as a summary indicator of the impacts. 
  To  implement  scenario  1,  we  assume  that  governments  have  the  fiscal  resources  to 
sustain existing sugar production subsidies. Producers receive the prevailing domestic market 
price under open borders but receive a production subsidy, which leaves the domestic policy 
support  to  production  unchanged.  This  is  of  course  an  artificial  device,  which  allows  us  to 
separate the specific effects of trade and domestic production policies. In reality, the mounting 
fiscal pressures of domestic subsidies would render them unsustainable in the medium run and 
                                                 
4 Since we initiated the investigation of the sugar model, a new (2003) FAPRI baseline has been 
established. The implications of updating baselines for sugar implied only marginal changes in 
the baseline trajectories and we therefore decided to keep the 2002 baseline as our reference run.   11 
policy reforms would follow.  
 
5. Results 
Trade Liberalization Reform 
Tables  2  and  3  present  trade  impacts,  and  changes  in  production  and  consumption  in  key 
countries for the first scenario, respectively. The trade table includes changes in the world price 
and New York spot price. Additional tables covering all countries are available in Appendix 1. 
The removal of all trade distortions increases the world sugar price by 32 percent on average 
during the simulation period. This average figure is inflated by a very strong initial price shock, 
which eventually tapers to 27 percent in 2011/12. The latter figure provides an estimate of the 
long-term  response  of  world  markets,  as  production  adjustments  take  time.  Aggregate  trade 
increases at a moderate 3 percent by the end of the decade. The depth of the world market price 
formation  mechanism  increases  dramatically,  however,  since  preferential  trade  and  export 
subsidies are eliminated. This mostly concerns E.U. imports and exports, and U.S. and Japanese 
imports. Aggregate effects on world production and consumption are small, but relocation of 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, production is substantial because of the magnitude of the 
price effects. In countries supporting their sugar producers with domestic policies, production 
changes little. Sugar consumption in the United States, the European Union, and Japan increases 
by  1.3,  4.5,  and  2.9  percent  respectively.  Consumption  in  India  increases  on  average  by  4 
percent, or 0.8 mmt. Production does not change because of domestic farm policies in place. The 
increase in consumption induces a trade pattern reversal, making India a net importer of sugar. In 
China, sugar use decreases by 3.6 percent and production increases by 4.3 percent, inducing a 
decrease of net imports of 0.7 mmt. Production increases in Australia (+4.9 percent) and Brazil   12 
(+7.9%), and it falls notably in Eastern Europe (-8 percent), the FSU (-13.4 percent), Japan 
(-13.5 percent), and the Philippines (-14.4 percent).  
Trade Liberalization and Domestic Production Subsidy Reforms 
  Tables  4  and  5  show  the  results  for  the  combined  removal  of  trade  distortions  and 
domestic  policies  affecting  production.  Major  changes  occur  with  the  additional  removal  of 
domestic production subsidies. The removal of all trade and production distortions induces a 43 
percent price increase by the end of the outlook period. Aggregate trade expands moderately, but 
location of production and trade patterns are substantially affected. Protectionist OECD countries 
(the European Union, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico and the United States) experience an 
import  expansion  or  export  reduction  and  significant  contraction  in  production.  World  beet 
production decreases by 21 percent by the end of the decade, whereas world cane production 
increases by 8 percent. Hence, in aggregate terms, the conventional wisdom holds that cane 
sugar production tends to be more competitive than beet sugar production. Brazil, Australia, 
Cuba, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey expand production when all distortions are removed.  
Aggregate world sugar production and use decrease by 2.9 percent. The world price increases 
further, to 48 percent above the baseline level in 2011/12. Production relocation away from the 
most protected OECD markets is massive (European Union, -61 percent; Japan, -61 percent. The 
effect is smaller for Mexico (-7 percent) and the United States (-6 percent). Production goes to 
competitive producers in developing economies (Brazil, 17 percent; Cuba, 16 percent; Australia, 
10 percent), but also to producers in less-competitive countries (e.g., Turkey, 33 percent).  This 
result is caused by the high world price resulting from removal of trade and domestic distortion 
that affects production. The net incentive effect is positive for producers (a world price increase 
net of tariff and subsidies removal).    13 
The changes in consumption observed in the first scenario are accentuated in this second 
scenario. Countries with moderate border protection experience further worsening of consumer 
prices. For example, in China, consumption decreases by 13 percent.  In countries with high 
tariffs, the benefits from policy reforms accruing to domestic consumers are mitigated by the 
stronger world price increases. However, since sugar demand tends to be inelastic, these changes 
are not dramatic. Sugar consumption in the European Union-15 increases by 3 percent and in 
Japan by 2 percent. U.S. consumption increases by less than 1 percent. 
Full Market Liberalization (Trade, Consumption, and Production Reforms) 
  In this scenario, distortions are removed in Egypt, India, and Morocco.
5 Impacts on world 
markets price effects are marginal relative to scenario 2. By 2011/12, the world price increase is 
47 percent or 1 percent lower than in scenario 2. Hence, the bulk of the effects of this reform 
occur in the countries removing their own consumer price distortions. In Egypt, consumption 
decreases by 21 percent, whereas it would decrease by 15 percent under scenario 2. In Cuba, 
because of the large subsidy removal, consumption decreases significantly, by an average of 42.5 
percent between 2002/03 and 2011/12. Finally, in Morocco, the removal of the consumption 
subsidy results in the reduction of sugar consumption by 11 percent relative to the baseline. 
Under scenario 2, consumption would decrease by nearly 4 percent.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We analyzed a sequence of policy reforms in international sugar markets, considering in turn 
multilateral  trade  liberalization  in  the  first  scenario,  and  then  the  removal  of  domestic  farm 
                                                 
5 Although in the past sugar was sold at subsidized prices to consumers in Turkey, consumer 
sugar subsidies have been gradually reduced over the last several years and prices have increased 
according to production costs, resulting in consumption increases closer to the population growth 
rate. For this reason, consumer subsidies in Turkey were not considered.   14 
policies in the second scenario. A third scenario analyzed the removal of pure consumption 
distortions —a minor reform relative to the two former reforms. 
  We obtained large price effects. We found that by the end of the outlook period, world 
prices increase by about 27 percent with the imposition of free trade and by a staggering 48 
percent when all trade and production distortions are removed. These figures are slightly inflated 
by strong initial price shocks, which take time to taper because of the slow dynamic adjustment 
of sugar production. Supply adjustment in sugar production takes time, and the price changes in 
the later years provide a sense of how markets would adjust in the long run to such radical policy 
shocks.    These  estimates  of  the  price  effects  are  large  but  within  the  ballpark  of  previous 
estimates  obtained  with  partial-equilibrium  models  (Sheales,  Hafi,  and  Toyne,  1999;  
Wolhgenant, 1999). Sugar markets are price inelastic both on the supply and demand sides. This 
fundamental  characteristic  explains  why  reforms have  large  price  effects  but  more  moderate 
effects on production, consumption, and trade.  
  Despite the near collapse of the Doha Round of agricultural negotiations, the U.S. sugar 
industry is keen on promoting a multilateral approach to sugar policy reform and has vehemently 
opposed the bilateral negotiations of the current U.S. administration. The multilateral negotiation 
argument has been a convenient veil of legitimacy for U.S. protectionist interests. For example, 
the  sugar  industry  fought  the  U.S.-Australia  FTA  on  that  basis.  Nevertheless,  our  numbers 
provide  some  credence  to  the  U.S.  sugar  industry  claim  of  the  “world  dump  price,”  and  it 
appears that the competitive segment of the U.S. sugar industry would survive in unfettered 
markets.  A  major  qualifier  to  our  analysis  is  that  our  model  may  understate  exit/entry  and 
investment decisions. The drastic world price increases predicted by our analysis may induce 
massive investment in sugar production and reduce these price changes considerably.   15 
  Despite these limitations, it is clear that a massive production relocation would take place 
away from protected OECD markets (the European Union; Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico 
and  the  United  States)  and  toward  competitive  producers  in  developing  economies,  chiefly 
Brazil, Cuba, and Australia, but also to producers in less-competitive countries such as Turkey 
because of the large price effects. Hence, there is a large overlap of sugar interests in the FTAA, 
the U.S.-Australia FTA, and the CAIRNS group to open U.S. borders. The European Union and 
Japan have virtually everything to lose in unfettered markets. The large increase in price is little 
solace for their sugar producers, who would probably be wiped out. E.U. producers might want 
to focus on quickly negotiating a buy-out program within the ongoing CAP reforms, while the 
Doha Round evolves slowly and the EBA agreement is not yet fully implemented. Japanese 
sugar producers may well be the last bastion of protectionism in global sugar markets. 
  In  contrast, sugar interests in Mexico and the United States would lose in unfettered 
markets, but they would survive the global policy reform without being annihilated. Although at 
odds within NAFTA, the two countries have a common goal in resisting global sugar policy 
reform. This is ironic since they are implicated in the undoing of their own protections because 
of their NAFTA and Uruguay Round commitments. 
  The analysis also makes clear that trade liberalization without domestic reforms would 
induce  import  surges  in  the  United  States.  These  surges  would  make  domestic  programs 
unsustainable  because  of  the  current  policy  commitments.  A  similar  pattern  emerges  in  the 
European Union, which is constrained in its ability to export expensive domestic sugar displaced 
by cheaper imports. Of course one should never underestimate the strength of the sugar lobby in 
OECD countries, and many sugar specialists have wrongly predicted the imminent unraveling of 
sugar protectionism as shown in the recent outcome of the Australian-US FTA.   16 
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(1) 
Country  Trade and Domestic Policies 
Algeria  imposes a tariff rate of 15% on cane sugar and 5% on beet sugar. 
   
Argentina 
 
imposes a 20% tariff on sugar imports in addition to a variable duty of $60/ton on imports from Brazil.  A 5% export tax is in place as well as a 4.05% export 
rebate. 
   
Australia  ended administered price arrangements in 1989 and removed import tariffs in 1997.  
   
Brazil 
 
imposes a 17.5% tariff on imports from non-MERCOSUL countries (Brazil has zero imports). Although high-cost growers in the Northeast region are to receive a 
small subsidy (BRR 5.07/mt), this support has not been received for the past few years. 
   
Canada 
 
imposes a tariff on refined imports from MFNs equal to CAD $30.86/ton and on raw imports equal to CAD $22.07 to CAD $24.69/tonne (depending on the 
polarization of sugar). Developing countries pay zero duty on raw sugar, and Australia and Cuba, from where the bulk of the raw sugar is imported, are exempt 
from duty. 
   
China 
 
provides a 'guidance price' to sugar refiners to guide prices paid for sugarcane and sugar beet, but market forces largely determine prices. China has a TRQ of 1.64 
million tons at a 20% in-quota rate and a 76% above-quota rate. The TRQ increases to 1.945 million tons by 2004 with an above-quota rate of 65%. 





Sugar imports from the Andean community are allowed duty free. The basic duty on raw and refined sugar imports from the non-Andean Community is 20%. In 
addition, a variable surcharge is calculated based upon adjusted floor, ceiling, and reference prices. In 2002, the total effective duty (basic plus surcharge) on raw 
sugar imports was $114/ton and on refined imports was $85/ton. Export subsidies of 2.5% of the f.o.b. value for centrifugal and panela sugar is received by 
Colombian exporters. This is not provided for exports to the United States. Colombia sets guaranteed sugar prices close to the world price. 
   
Cuba 
 
imposes a tariff rate of 10% on raw and refined sugar. The sugar industry is under the control of the Cuban government
(2). The domestic price of sugar is 
subsidized by the Cuban government under a rationing system.  A monthly allowance of 6 pounds of sugar is provided at 0.13¢/lb. 




imposes an in-quota tariff on sugar imports of 40% with a minimum of EUR 0.17/kg and an out-of-quota tariff rate of 96% with a minimum of EUR 0.43/kg. 
Although minimum sugar prices are set by the government, Poland has not been able to enforce them. 





imposes a 5% import tariff on raw sugar and a 10% tariff on refined sugar. The government also establishes sugarcane and sugar beet prices (set in 2002 at LE 
95/ton and LE 77/ton respectively). Sugar consumption is subsidized. 500,000 tons of white sugar is sold at 60 piasters/kg to ration card-holders while another 
500,000 tons is sold at 130 piasters/kg. Non-rationed sugar is sold at LE 1.30/kg through government outlets while the retail price in private shops is between LE 
1.6/kg and LE 2/kg (1 LE = 100 piasters). 









sets intervention prices for farmers and national aid for Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Export refunds are paid to exporters to cover the gap between the E.U. price and 
the world price when sugar is sold from intervention stocks. Production quotas are used to limit the sugar eligible for support. The surplus of A and B production 
above domestic consumption is exported with subsidy. C quota sugar must be exported at world prices. Sugar imported from ACP is re-exported with subsidy. 
Production levies are applied to quota sugar production to cover export refunds (2% on A and B quotas and between 30% and 37.5% on B quota plus additional 
levies to cover shortfalls in export refunds in the previous year). The import levy is a fixed duty plus a safeguard clause allowing variable additional duty. 1.3 
million tons of white sugar equivalent preferential imports from ACP countries are at guaranteed prices and an additional 0.2-0.3 million tons at 85% of the 
guaranteed price. The with-in quota rate is EUR 98/ton and out-of-quota rate is EUR339/ton. Everything-But-Arms is limited by quotas until 2009 when duty-free 
access is allowed.  
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had a total TRQ of 3.65 million tons in 2002 (3.35 million tons for the first six months and 0.3 million tons for the remaining months). Seasonal tariffs are added 
during periods of peak domestic production to protect producers and support prices. The in-quota tariff rate was 5% but no less than EUR 0.015/kg and the over-
quota rate was set at 40% for raw and white sugar but no less than EUR 0.12/kg for raw sugar and EUR 0.14/kg for white sugar. The over-quota seasonal rate was 
50% but not less than EUR 0.15 /kg for raw sugar and EUR 0.18/kg for white sugar.  




imposes an import duty of 60% plus INR 850/ton countervailing duty on raw sugar. National minimum support price for sugarcane (INR 620/ton in 2001/02) are 
augmented by state governments by another 20% to 50%. Sugar millers and importers are required to sell portion of supplies to PDS at below market prices for 
resale to low-income consumers (15% of production and imports). There is a transport subsidy to encourage exports ( INR 140/ton in 2001/02). 
   
Indonesia 
 
imposes a tariff rate of 20% on raw cane sugar and 25% on beet sugar. To support farmers’ incomes, the government also sets a sugar floor price (IDR 2,600/kg in 
2001/02).  
   
Iran  imposes a tariff rate of 19% on sugar imports 
(5). 








imposes a prohibitive duty on refined sugar of JPY 21.5/kg with an additional surcharge of JPY 53.88/kg. In 2001, the minimum producer price for sugar beet was 
JPY 17,040/ton and JPY 20,370/ton for sugarcane. A target price is set for sugar refiners to allow them to pay the guaranteed price to farmers and a subsidy is 
provided to the refiners to cover the difference between the domestic market price and the target price. The difference is made up by a subsidy provided by a 
surcharge on imported sugar, other surcharges, and funds from Japan's national budget. The current subsidy for refiners is JPY 90 billion, 85% from surcharge on 
raw sugar imports. In 2001, average import price was JPY 32,580/ton and the resale price was JPY 59,960/ton, implying a surcharge of JPY 27,380/ton. A 
secondary surcharge is imposed on import companies that exceed their raw sugar import volume target (JPY 23,309/ton). The volume of target imports was 1.47 
million metric tons. Japan does not impose import tariffs on raw sugar. 
   
Malaysia 
 
controls sugar imports through quota restrictions by licenses. The country imposes a 5% ad valorem rate on sugar imports as well as a specific tax .Wholesale and 
retail sugar prices are controlled (MYR 1,345/ton for the wholesale price and MYR 1.4/kg for the retail price). 




imposes a duty of $0.3166/kg on U.S. sugar imports and $0.3958/kg on third-country imports. Every year the government announces the reference price for 
standard sugar, which is used to calculate the price paid to sugarcane growers.  Growers are given 57% of the wholesale reference price of a ton of standard sugar 
(MX pesos 4,561.08/ton in 2001/02). 





imposes a 35% tariff rate on sugar imports plus a 0.25% parafiscal tax and 123% of the difference between a threshold price (MAD 3,500/ton) and the CIF price 
(if the latter is less than the former). The country sets support prices for beet and cane with additional bonus for various regions (MAD 325/ton for sugar beet and 
MAD 220/ton for sugarcane with additional bonus ranging between MAD 25/ton and MAD 55/ton). The government subsidies sugar consumption at the retail 
level. In 2001, the government paid refineries a subsidy of MAD 2,000/ton. 
   
Pakistan 
 
imposes a 30% import tariff on raw and refined sugar. The country also sets a producer support price, although market prices are usually above support prices 
(currently 50% above). 
   
Philippines  has sugar imports duties set at 65%. 
   
Peru 
 
imposes a tariff rate of 25% and an additional duty based on the price band system used in Colombia. The domestic price is set by the market based on supply and 
demand. 
   
South Africa 
 
imposes duties based on the difference between the world price and a set reference price. The duty was ZAR 784/ton in 2001 and ZAR 1312/ton in July 2002. 
South Africa provides import access of sugar to Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   20 
Table 1: continued 
South Korea  imposes a 3% tariff on raw sugar and a temporary 50% tariff on refined sugar. The wholesale sugar price is controlled by the government. 




maintains high internal sugar prices using quotas and import tariffs. The country has a 65% in-quota tariff rate and a 99% out-of-quota tariff rate. The government 
sets initial and final producer prices for sugarcane (THB 530/ton in 2002). If the final price is greater than the initial price, a supplement is paid to the growers; if 
the final price is less than the initial price, the government compensates the mills for the difference. 




imposes a 138% tariff rate on sugar imports but 110.45% of c.i.f. value for imports from the E.U. Turkey sets production quotas for refined beet sugar and corn 
sweeteners and administered floor prices for sugar beet. Quota A is set for domestic consumption; B (2% of A quota) is set to meet emergency needs; C sugar 
(produced in excess of A and B) is sold in the world market at prevailing prices below domestic prices as it cannot be sold domestically. Turkey sets a support 
price for sugar beet (TRL 50,000/kg in marketing year 2002). Retail prices are determined by market forces. 






has an MFN import duty of 0.625/lb (raw value) but most quota suppliers are exempt. The above-TRQ rate is 15.36¢/lb for raw sugar and 16.21¢/lb for refined 
sugar (TRQ was 1.361 million tons in 2001 and 1.289 million tons in 2002). Under NAFTA, Mexico has duty-free access to the U.S. of up to 25,000 MTRV until 
2008 when all imports from Mexico are duty free. Raw sugar over-quota tariff for Mexico is 9.07¢/lb, which drops about 1.5¢/lb each year to zero by 2008. 
Sugarcane processors see a loan rate of $0.18/lb for raw cane sugar and $0.229/lb for refined beet sugar. Processors can forfeit sugar to the CCC if the minimum 
selling price is less than the loan rate plus the interest rate. The minimum raw sugar market price to discourage forfeitures is 19.86¢/lb for raw cane sugar and 
24.78¢/lb for refined beet sugar. 
   
Venezuela 
 
imposes a 15% tariff-rate (0% for the Andean Community) and an additional duty based on the price band system used in Colombia and Peru. Venezuela does not 
provide producer support prices. 
(1)  All policies are as of 2001/02. 
(2)  The Cuban sugar industry is currently undergoing significant restructuring. 
(3)  Poland is used to represent Eastern Europe as its production constitutes 60% of total sugar production in Eastern Europe. 
(4)  Russia is used to represent the Former Soviet Union as it is the region’s largest importer. The Ukraine sets minimum purchase prices for sugar beets and refined sugar at the 
wholesale level. However, sugar prices are often below the mandated minimum. 
(5)  Regional average. Table 2: Impact of Trade Liberalization Reform on Sugar Trade for Selected Countries
01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 Average
Major Net Exporters
Australia
   Baseline 3,646 4,007 4,398 4,811 4,920 5,025 5,130 5,238 5,346 5,456 5,568 4989.95
   WTO 3,646 4,065 4,677 5,152 5,282 5,402 5,512 5,616 5,719 5,824 5,931 5318.02
   % chg 0.00% 1.45% 6.34% 7.08% 7.37% 7.50% 7.46% 7.23% 6.98% 6.73% 6.51% 6.46%
Brazil
   Baseline 9,500 10,919 11,147 11,295 11,243 11,351 11,401 11,377 11,406 11,456 11,521 11311.48
   WTO 9,500 11,449 12,878 13,413 13,519 13,712 13,812 13,812 13,854 13,914 13,983 13434.52
   % chg 0.00% 4.86% 15.53% 18.75% 20.24% 20.80% 21.15% 21.40% 21.46% 21.46% 21.37% 18.70% #DIV/0!
Cuba
   Baseline 2,700 2,625 2,741 2,863 3,002 3,145 3,293 3,449 3,611 3,778 3,953 3245.84
   WTO 2,700 2,683 2,849 3,018 3,198 3,398 3,600 3,807 4,016 4,227 4,442 3523.86
   % chg 0.00% 2.23% 3.94% 5.41% 6.51% 8.05% 9.34% 10.39% 11.23% 11.89% 12.38% 8.14% #DIV/0!
European Union
   Baseline 1,850 3,065 3,170 3,248 3,385 3,555 3,753 3,960 4,177 4,403 4,634 3734.87
   WTO 1,850 2,198 2,288 2,432 2,660 2,867 3,086 3,327 3,570 3,817 4,078 3032.31
   % chg 0.00% -28.29% -27.81% -25.12% -21.42% -19.36% -17.76% -15.98% -14.53% -13.31% -11.99% -19.56% #DIV/0!
Thailand
   Baseline 3,550 3,662 3,816 3,925 4,042 4,144 4,241 4,347 4,452 4,562 4,607 4179.72
   WTO 3,550 3,619 3,690 3,744 3,819 3,893 3,973 4,066 4,161 4,262 4,297 3952.38
   % chg 0.00% -1.16% -3.31% -4.61% -5.50% -6.06% -6.33% -6.47% -6.54% -6.58% -6.72% -5.33%
World Net Exports
   Baseline 24,816 28,006 29,007 29,878 30,434 31,165 31,931 32,666 33,479 34,332 35,097 31599.57
   WTO 24,816 27,219 29,036 30,336 31,044 31,910 32,776 33,555 34,396 35,254 36,021 32154.78
   % chg 0.00% -2.81% 0.10% 1.53% 2.01% 2.39% 2.65% 2.72% 2.74% 2.69% 2.63% 1.66%
Major Net Importers
China
   Baseline 1,177 1,159 1,201 1,169 1,203 1,219 1,310 1,478 1,690 1,923 2,155 1450.67
   WTO 1,177 212 169 268 423 523 672 896 1,155 1,435 1,711 746.37
   % chg 0.00% -81.71% -85.93% -77.10% -64.87% -57.13% -48.68% -39.36% -31.64% -25.40% -20.58% -53.24% #DIV/0!
Former Soviet Union
   Baseline 6,286 7,565 7,469 7,520 7,471 7,516 7,600 7,651 7,716 7,791 7,840 7613.89
   WTO 6,286 7,656 7,796 8,075 8,197 8,363 8,530 8,635 8,735 8,832 8,893 8371.37
   % chg 0.00% 1.21% 4.38% 7.39% 9.72% 11.27% 12.23% 12.87% 13.21% 13.37% 13.43% 9.91% #DIV/0!
Indonesia
   Baseline 1,600 1,406 1,789 2,003 2,133 2,230 2,320 2,401 2,486 2,579 2,680 2202.74
   WTO 1,600 1,307 1,685 1,895 2,000 2,087 2,165 2,228 2,297 2,374 2,456 2049.34
   % chg 0.00% -7.01% -5.80% -5.42% -6.23% -6.45% -6.69% -7.19% -7.60% -7.94% -8.38% -6.87% #DIV/0!
Japan
   Baseline 1,548 1,553 1,536 1,529 1,524 1,524 1,525 1,527 1,529 1,532 1,535 1531.41
   WTO 1,548 1,642 1,647 1,672 1,692 1,716 1,737 1,752 1,767 1,779 1,789 1719.17
   % chg 0.00% 5.72% 7.21% 9.38% 10.99% 12.60% 13.88% 14.79% 15.52% 16.10% 16.52% 12.27% #DIV/0!
United States
   Baseline 1,344 1,616 1,799 1,966 2,164 2,397 2,555 2,707 2,866 3,028 3,132 2423.20
   WTO 1,344 2,723 2,759 2,910 2,917 3,021 3,093 3,146 3,229 3,300 3,340 3043.80
   % chg 0.00% 68.46% 53.38% 48.03% 34.82% 26.02% 21.03% 16.22% 12.63% 8.99% 6.62% 29.62%
Raw Sugar Prices
FOB Caribbean
   Baseline 190 186 199 199 211 215 216 222 227 232 239 214.61
   WTO 190 280 267 264 276 279 281 287 292 296 302 282.31
   % chg 0.00% 50.56% 34.38% 32.92% 30.55% 30.04% 29.80% 28.90% 28.23% 27.43% 26.65% 31.95% #DIV/0!
New York Spot
   Baseline 465 458 439 427 418 409 408 407 402 396 394 415.78
   WTO 465 302 289 286 298 301 303 309 314 318 325 304.35
   % chg 0.00% -34.13% -34.10% -32.92% -28.80% -26.31% -25.81% -24.09% -22.03% -19.71% -17.72% -26.56%
(Thousand Metric Tons)
(U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
(Thousand Metric Tons)
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   Baseline 4,662 5,035 5,437 5,862 5,978 6,093 6,210 6,327 6,445 6,564 6,684 6063.38
   WTO 4,662 5,035 5,682 6,175 6,315 6,447 6,570 6,684 6,797 6,911 7,026 6364.24
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 4.52% 5.34% 5.65% 5.80% 5.81% 5.65% 5.47% 5.28% 5.11% 4.86%
Consumption
   Baseline 1,020 1,031 1,041 1,053 1,059 1,069 1,081 1,090 1,099 1,108 1,117 1074.69
   WTO 1,020 1,004 1,018 1,030 1,038 1,047 1,059 1,068 1,078 1,087 1,095 1052.37
   % chg 0.00% -2.58% -2.16% -2.12% -2.04% -2.03% -2.02% -2.00% -1.98% -1.95% -1.93% -2.08%
Brazilian
Production
   Baseline 18,500 20,624 21,077 21,442 21,591 21,893 22,118 22,251 22,415 22,577 22,729 21871.81
   WTO 18,500 20,597 22,453 23,215 23,531 23,910 24,175 24,327 24,496 24,663 24,812 23617.86
   % chg 0.00% -0.13% 6.53% 8.27% 8.98% 9.21% 9.30% 9.33% 9.29% 9.24% 9.16% 7.92%
Consumption
   Baseline 9,450 9,706 9,936 10,154 10,355 10,549 10,723 10,879 11,014 11,125 11,211 10565.25
   WTO 9,450 9,277 9,592 9,808 10,016 10,203 10,367 10,518 10,646 10,751 10,831 10201.03
   % chg 0.00% -4.42% -3.46% -3.40% -3.27% -3.28% -3.32% -3.32% -3.34% -3.36% -3.39% -3.46%
Cuban
Production
   Baseline 3,200 3,329 3,463 3,608 3,758 3,918 4,083 4,253 4,428 4,610 4,798 4024.91
   WTO 3,200 3,329 3,536 3,731 3,923 4,141 4,361 4,581 4,805 5,031 5,259 4269.67
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 2.12% 3.40% 4.39% 5.69% 6.79% 7.73% 8.49% 9.12% 9.61% 5.73%
Consumption
   Baseline 700 718 728 744 754 769 784 798 812 826 839 777.13
   WTO 700 665 694 712 724 738 754 768 782 797 811 744.48
   % chg 0.00% -7.32% -4.65% -4.30% -4.05% -3.95% -3.87% -3.74% -3.64% -3.50% -3.40% -4.24%
European Union
Production
   Baseline 16,178 17,835 18,013 18,141 18,318 18,522 18,746 18,982 19,229 19,486 19,752 18702.35
   WTO 16,178 17,835 18,013 18,141 18,318 18,522 18,746 18,982 19,229 19,486 19,752 18702.35
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Consumption
   Baseline 14,700 14,768 14,815 14,851 14,888 14,921 14,950 14,982 15,015 15,050 15,088 14932.70
   WTO 14,700 15,425 15,563 15,601 15,593 15,607 15,620 15,625 15,635 15,649 15,659 15597.65
   % chg 0.00% 4.45% 5.05% 5.04% 4.74% 4.59% 4.48% 4.29% 4.13% 3.98% 3.79% 4.46%
Thai
Production
   Baseline 5,225 5,505 5,697 5,866 6,032 6,199 6,369 6,541 6,717 6,895 7,012 6283.39
   WTO 5,225 5,505 5,668 5,783 5,914 6,053 6,206 6,370 6,539 6,713 6,826 6157.79
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -0.52% -1.42% -1.94% -2.35% -2.56% -2.62% -2.64% -2.64% -2.66% -1.94%
Consumption
   Baseline 1,750 1,807 1,862 1,922 1,982 2,047 2,114 2,183 2,254 2,327 2,401 2090.00
   WTO 1,750 1,841 1,946 2,013 2,082 2,149 2,220 2,294 2,369 2,446 2,525 2188.66
   % chg 0.00% 1.92% 4.51% 4.70% 5.02% 5.02% 5.00% 5.07% 5.10% 5.14% 5.17% 4.67%
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Table 3: Impact of Trade Liberalization Reform on Sugar Production and 
Consumption for Selected Countries 
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   Baseline 7,623 7,735 7,824 8,026 8,180 8,359 8,494 8,593 8,713 8,846 8,980 8375.08
   WTO 7,623 7,735 8,432 8,557 8,650 8,767 8,863 8,934 9,025 9,135 9,244 8733.96
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 7.77% 6.61% 5.74% 4.88% 4.35% 3.97% 3.57% 3.26% 2.94% 4.31%
Consumption
   Baseline 8,800 8,903 9,046 9,203 9,396 9,582 9,802 10,075 10,412 10,782 11,149 9834.95
   WTO 8,800 8,071 8,612 8,820 9,072 9,284 9,526 9,827 10,184 10,576 10,965 9493.71
   % chg 0.00% -9.35% -4.80% -4.16% -3.45% -3.11% -2.81% -2.46% -2.19% -1.90% -1.66% -3.59%
Former Soviet Union
Production
   Baseline 4,111 4,250 4,327 4,412 4,462 4,529 4,580 4,614 4,650 4,686 4,719 4523.13
   WTO 4,111 4,250 4,212 4,037 3,893 3,823 3,781 3,754 3,751 3,764 3,782 3904.78
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -2.68% -8.49% -12.75% -15.60% -17.45% -18.64% -19.33% -19.68% -19.86% -13.45%
Consumption
   Baseline 11,649 11,819 11,846 11,985 12,013 12,124 12,256 12,348 12,453 12,565 12,654 12206.35
   WTO 11,649 11,870 11,976 12,118 12,146 12,254 12,383 12,473 12,575 12,686 12,773 12325.21
   % chg 0.00% 0.44% 1.09% 1.11% 1.10% 1.07% 1.03% 1.01% 0.98% 0.96% 0.94% 0.97%
Indonesian
Production
   Baseline 1,700 1,619 1,593 1,593 1,617 1,652 1,694 1,739 1,788 1,838 1,889 1702.10
   WTO 1,700 1,619 1,620 1,620 1,642 1,676 1,717 1,761 1,809 1,858 1,908 1723.01
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 1.67% 1.67% 1.59% 1.43% 1.33% 1.27% 1.20% 1.12% 1.04% 1.23%
Consumption
   Baseline 3,400 3,481 3,569 3,676 3,788 3,905 4,031 4,155 4,288 4,431 4,585 3990.96
   WTO 3,400 3,406 3,498 3,597 3,687 3,789 3,900 4,007 4,122 4,249 4,382 3863.72
   % chg 0.00% -2.14% -1.99% -2.16% -2.68% -2.98% -3.23% -3.56% -3.86% -4.12% -4.43% -3.12%
Japanese
Production
   Baseline 795 803 814 827 840 852 863 873 882 891 898 854.26
   WTO 795 803 792 770 751 735 721 711 703 695 689 736.93
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -2.73% -6.99% -10.53% -13.77% -16.42% -18.53% -20.36% -21.92% -23.29% -13.46%
Consumption
   Baseline 2,350 2,341 2,344 2,354 2,364 2,376 2,388 2,400 2,411 2,423 2,433 2383.36
   WTO 2,350 2,423 2,430 2,439 2,443 2,451 2,458 2,464 2,470 2,475 2,478 2453.02
   % chg 0.00% 3.48% 3.63% 3.58% 3.35% 3.16% 2.96% 2.70% 2.43% 2.16% 1.87% 2.93%
United States
Production
   Baseline 7,189 7,924 8,065 8,034 7,983 7,942 7,906 7,917 7,940 7,958 7,983 7965.40
   WTO 7,189 7,924 7,478 7,441 7,498 7,580 7,670 7,729 7,787 7,856 7,922 7688.57
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -7.29% -7.38% -6.07% -4.56% -2.99% -2.38% -1.93% -1.28% -0.77% -3.46%
Consumption
   Baseline 9,335 9,469 9,669 9,853 10,026 10,203 10,362 10,517 10,676 10,834 10,976 10258.58
   WTO 9,335 9,673 9,862 10,031 10,176 10,335 10,488 10,632 10,777 10,921 11,050 10394.51
   % chg 0.00% 2.16% 1.99% 1.81% 1.50% 1.29% 1.22% 1.09% 0.95% 0.80% 0.68% 1.35%
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Table 3: Impact of Trade Liberalization Reform on Sugar Production and 
Consumption for Selected Countries (continued)
 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 Average
Major Net Exporters
Australia
   Baseline 3,646 4,007 4,398 4,811 4,920 5,025 5,130 5,238 5,346 5,456 5,568 4989.95
   WTO 3,646 4,145 5,056 5,559 5,736 5,859 5,952 6,033 6,112 6,190 6,273 5691.56
   % chg 0.00% 3.46% 14.95% 15.55% 16.60% 16.60% 16.03% 15.18% 14.32% 13.44% 12.66% 13.88%
Brazil
   Baseline 9,500 10,919 11,147 11,295 11,243 11,351 11,401 11,377 11,406 11,456 11,521 11311.48
   WTO 9,500 12,232 15,359 16,136 16,567 16,786 16,811 16,728 16,674 16,609 16,552 16045.25
   % chg 0.00% 12.03% 37.79% 42.86% 47.35% 47.88% 47.45% 47.03% 46.19% 44.99% 43.66% 41.72% #DIV/0!
Cuba
   Baseline 2,700 2,625 2,741 2,863 3,002 3,145 3,293 3,449 3,611 3,778 3,953 3245.84
   WTO 2,700 2,752 3,064 3,338 3,625 3,912 4,188 4,461 4,725 4,982 5,234 4028.13
   % chg 0.00% 4.85% 11.77% 16.59% 20.75% 24.40% 27.20% 29.34% 30.88% 31.86% 32.42% 23.01% #DIV/0!
European Union
   Baseline 1,850 3,065 3,170 3,248 3,385 3,555 3,753 3,960 4,177 4,403 4,634 3734.87
   WTO 1,850 -5,821 -7,758 -8,894 -9,165 -9,124 -8,934 -8,649 -8,306 -7,944 -7,555 -8214.96
   % chg 0.00% -289.90% -344.76% -373.78% -370.77% -356.63% -338.09% -318.42% -298.87% -280.45% -263.04% -323.47% #DIV/0!
Thailand
   Baseline 3,550 3,662 3,816 3,925 4,042 4,144 4,241 4,347 4,452 4,562 4,607 4179.72
   WTO 3,550 3,825 3,951 4,052 4,132 4,198 4,268 4,347 4,425 4,508 4,527 4223.20
   % chg 0.00% 4.47% 3.55% 3.23% 2.23% 1.30% 0.63% 0.00% -0.62% -1.18% -1.73% 1.19%
World Net Exports
   Baseline 24,816 28,006 29,007 29,878 30,434 31,165 31,931 32,666 33,479 34,332 35,097 31599.57
   WTO 24,816 21,891 23,651 23,620 24,191 24,964 25,788 26,588 27,492 28,391 29,202 25577.84
   % chg 0.00% -21.84% -18.46% -20.95% -20.51% -19.90% -19.24% -18.61% -17.88% -17.30% -16.80% -19.15%
Major Net Importers
China
   Baseline 1,177 1,159 1,201 1,169 1,203 1,219 1,310 1,478 1,690 1,923 2,155 1450.67
   WTO 1,177 -1,853 -1,914 -1,950 -1,689 -1,343 -984 -598 -182 233 624 -965.58
   % chg 0.00% -259.92% -259.35% -266.78% -240.37% -210.19% -175.13% -140.45% -110.77% -87.91% -71.02% -182.19% #DIV/0!
Former Soviet Union
   Baseline 6,286 7,565 7,469 7,520 7,471 7,516 7,600 7,651 7,716 7,791 7,840 7613.89
   WTO 6,286 7,086 6,898 6,952 6,938 7,058 7,220 7,345 7,489 7,644 7,767 7239.65
   % chg 0.00% -6.33% -7.64% -7.55% -7.14% -6.10% -5.00% -4.00% -2.94% -1.89% -0.93% -4.95% #DIV/0!
Indonesia
   Baseline 1,600 1,406 1,789 2,003 2,133 2,230 2,320 2,401 2,486 2,579 2,680 2202.74
   WTO 1,600 1,163 1,052 1,124 1,095 1,069 1,057 1,035 1,009 992 977 1057.30
   % chg 0.00% -17.28% -41.18% -43.90% -48.64% -52.06% -54.45% -56.88% -59.42% -61.53% -63.56% -49.89% #DIV/0!
Japan
   Baseline 1,548 1,553 1,536 1,529 1,524 1,524 1,525 1,527 1,529 1,532 1,535 1531.41
   WTO 1,548 1,597 1,745 1,870 1,979 2,072 2,150 2,212 2,260 2,296 2,320 2050.05
   % chg 0.00% 2.82% 13.59% 22.34% 29.79% 35.99% 40.99% 44.88% 47.81% 49.86% 51.11% 33.92% #DIV/0!
United States
   Baseline 1,344 1,616 1,799 1,966 2,164 2,397 2,555 2,707 2,866 3,028 3,132 2423.20
   WTO 1,344 1,803 2,462 2,677 2,913 3,049 3,141 3,226 3,321 3,390 3,430 2941.35
   % chg 0.00% 11.56% 36.87% 36.15% 34.66% 27.20% 22.92% 19.17% 15.85% 11.95% 9.51% 22.58%
Raw Sugar Prices
FOB Caribbean
   Baseline 190 186 199 199 211 215 216 222 227 232 239 214.61
   WTO 190 410 334 351 351 347 346 349 349 350 353 353.93
   % chg 0.00% 120.72% 68.06% 76.40% 66.08% 61.66% 59.99% 56.90% 53.39% 50.67% 47.94% 66.18% #DIV/0!
New York Spot
   Baseline 465 458 439 427 418 409 408 407 402 396 394 415.78
   WTO 465 432 356 373 373 369 368 371 371 372 375 375.97
   % chg 0.00% -5.67% -18.84% -12.67% -10.86% -9.69% -9.82% -8.78% -7.80% -6.09% -4.83% -9.50%
Table 4: Impact of Trade Liberalization and Domestic Production Subsidy Reforms 
on Sugar Trade for Selected Countries
(Thousand Metric Tons)
(U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
(Thousand Metric Tons)
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   Baseline 4,662 5,035 5,437 5,862 5,978 6,093 6,210 6,327 6,445 6,564 6,684 6063.38
   WTO 4,662 5,035 6,023 6,539 6,733 6,872 6,980 7,071 7,161 7,248 7,340 6700.27
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 10.78% 11.55% 12.64% 12.78% 12.40% 11.76% 11.12% 10.42% 9.81% 10.33%
Consumption
   Baseline 1,020 1,031 1,041 1,053 1,059 1,069 1,081 1,090 1,099 1,108 1,117 1074.69
   WTO 1,020 967 986 995 1,004 1,014 1,026 1,036 1,045 1,055 1,063 1019.19
   % chg 0.00% -6.16% -5.26% -5.44% -5.20% -5.10% -5.06% -4.99% -4.91% -4.84% -4.77% -5.17%
Brazilian
Production
   Baseline 18,500 20,624 21,077 21,442 21,591 21,893 22,118 22,251 22,415 22,577 22,729 21871.81
   WTO 18,500 20,607 24,451 25,348 26,035 26,446 26,619 26,680 26,752 26,783 26,796 25651.73
   % chg 0.00% -0.08% 16.01% 18.22% 20.58% 20.79% 20.35% 19.90% 19.35% 18.63% 17.89% 17.16%
Consumption
   Baseline 9,450 9,706 9,936 10,154 10,355 10,549 10,723 10,879 11,014 11,125 11,211 10565.25
   WTO 9,450 8,682 9,085 9,235 9,462 9,650 9,803 9,947 10,071 10,167 10,238 9633.87
   % chg 0.00% -10.55% -8.56% -9.05% -8.62% -8.52% -8.58% -8.57% -8.56% -8.62% -8.68% -8.83%
Cuban
Production
   Baseline 3,200 3,329 3,463 3,608 3,758 3,918 4,083 4,253 4,428 4,610 4,798 4024.91
   WTO 3,200 3,296 3,704 3,989 4,298 4,608 4,903 5,191 5,474 5,747 6,015 4722.58
   % chg 0.00% -0.99% 6.96% 10.55% 14.37% 17.61% 20.08% 22.07% 23.60% 24.66% 25.37% 16.43%
Consumption
   Baseline 700 718 728 744 754 769 784 798 812 826 839 777.13
   WTO 700 574 647 651 671 690 708 724 741 758 774 693.96
   % chg 0.00% -19.97% -11.09% -12.44% -11.05% -10.18% -9.76% -9.29% -8.66% -8.17% -7.75% -10.84%
European Union
Production
   Baseline 16,178 17,835 18,013 18,141 18,318 18,522 18,746 18,982 19,229 19,486 19,752 18702.35
   WTO 16,178 9,248 7,762 6,533 6,271 6,340 6,544 6,836 7,201 7,584 7,988 7230.69
   % chg 0.00% -48.14% -56.91% -63.98% -65.76% -65.77% -65.09% -63.99% -62.55% -61.08% -59.56% -61.28%
Consumption
   Baseline 14,700 14,768 14,815 14,851 14,888 14,921 14,950 14,982 15,015 15,050 15,088 14932.70
   WTO 14,700 14,995 15,356 15,336 15,367 15,405 15,429 15,446 15,474 15,499 15,520 15382.79
   % chg 0.00% 1.54% 3.65% 3.26% 3.22% 3.24% 3.21% 3.10% 3.05% 2.99% 2.87% 3.01%
Thai
Production
   Baseline 5,225 5,505 5,697 5,866 6,032 6,199 6,369 6,541 6,717 6,895 7,012 6283.39
   WTO 5,225 5,505 5,812 5,941 6,100 6,241 6,386 6,541 6,700 6,861 6,961 6304.78
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 2.01% 1.27% 1.13% 0.69% 0.28% 0.00% -0.26% -0.50% -0.72% 0.39%
Consumption
   Baseline 1,750 1,807 1,862 1,922 1,982 2,047 2,114 2,183 2,254 2,327 2,401 2090.00
   WTO 1,750 1,673 1,827 1,865 1,952 2,028 2,101 2,179 2,261 2,343 2,428 2065.81
   % chg 0.00% -7.43% -1.89% -2.97% -1.52% -0.89% -0.65% -0.20% 0.31% 0.72% 1.13% -1.34%
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Table 5: Impact of Trade Liberalization and Domestic Production Subsidy Reforms 
on Sugar Production and Consumption for Selected Countries
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   Baseline 7,623 7,735 7,824 8,026 8,180 8,359 8,494 8,593 8,713 8,846 8,980 8375.08
   WTO 7,623 7,640 9,532 9,481 9,709 9,740 9,712 9,685 9,698 9,726 9,769 9469.22
   % chg 0.00% -1.23% 21.82% 18.13% 18.69% 16.52% 14.34% 12.71% 11.30% 9.94% 8.78% 13.10%
Consumption
   Baseline 8,800 8,903 9,046 9,203 9,396 9,582 9,802 10,075 10,412 10,782 11,149 9834.95
   WTO 8,800 6,171 7,607 7,553 8,002 8,363 8,696 9,066 9,502 9,950 10,390 8529.91
   % chg 0.00% -30.69% -15.91% -17.93% -14.84% -12.71% -11.28% -10.02% -8.75% -7.71% -6.81% -13.66%
Former Soviet Union
Production
   Baseline 4,111 4,250 4,327 4,412 4,462 4,529 4,580 4,614 4,650 4,686 4,719 4523.13
   WTO 4,111 4,250 4,936 4,918 4,983 4,993 4,964 4,926 4,896 4,858 4,821 4854.56
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% 14.05% 11.47% 11.67% 10.23% 8.38% 6.78% 5.28% 3.68% 2.16% 7.37%
Consumption
   Baseline 11,649 11,819 11,846 11,985 12,013 12,124 12,256 12,348 12,453 12,565 12,654 12206.35
   WTO 11,649 11,548 11,814 11,914 11,973 12,101 12,239 12,339 12,454 12,574 12,669 12162.57
   % chg 0.00% -2.29% -0.27% -0.59% -0.34% -0.19% -0.14% -0.08% 0.01% 0.07% 0.12% -0.37%
Indonesian
Production
   Baseline 1,700 1,619 1,593 1,593 1,617 1,652 1,694 1,739 1,788 1,838 1,889 1702.10
   WTO 1,700 1,564 2,148 2,253 2,424 2,574 2,702 2,831 2,976 3,119 3,266 2585.88
   % chg 0.00% -3.35% 34.84% 41.43% 49.95% 55.79% 59.50% 62.80% 66.49% 69.71% 72.93% 51.01%
Consumption
   Baseline 3,400 3,481 3,569 3,676 3,788 3,905 4,031 4,155 4,288 4,431 4,585 3990.96
   WTO 3,400 3,256 3,386 3,463 3,560 3,664 3,774 3,880 3,998 4,124 4,258 3736.33
   % chg 0.00% -6.44% -5.13% -5.82% -6.02% -6.17% -6.37% -6.61% -6.77% -6.93% -7.14% -6.34%
Japanese
Production
   Baseline 795 803 814 827 840 852 863 873 882 891 898 854.26
   WTO 795 803 674 546 443 360 291 236 195 166 146 385.92
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -17.25% -34.07% -47.19% -57.77% -66.30% -72.95% -77.88% -81.41% -83.71% -53.85%
Consumption
   Baseline 2,350 2,341 2,344 2,354 2,364 2,376 2,388 2,400 2,411 2,423 2,433 2383.36
   WTO 2,350 2,381 2,409 2,413 2,421 2,432 2,441 2,448 2,456 2,462 2,467 2433.09
   % chg 0.00% 1.71% 2.76% 2.49% 2.44% 2.37% 2.23% 2.04% 1.85% 1.63% 1.39% 2.09%
United States
Production
   Baseline 7,189 7,924 8,065 8,034 7,983 7,942 7,906 7,917 7,940 7,958 7,983 7965.40
   WTO 7,189 7,924 7,824 7,204 7,230 7,296 7,348 7,386 7,463 7,538 7,614 7482.78
   % chg 0.00% 0.00% -2.99% -10.33% -9.44% -8.14% -7.07% -6.71% -6.01% -5.27% -4.62% -6.06%
Consumption
   Baseline 9,335 9,469 9,669 9,853 10,026 10,203 10,362 10,517 10,676 10,834 10,976 10258.58
   WTO 9,335 9,504 9,776 9,921 10,082 10,251 10,409 10,557 10,711 10,859 10,993 10306.18
   % chg 0.00% 0.36% 1.10% 0.69% 0.56% 0.47% 0.45% 0.38% 0.32% 0.23% 0.15% 0.47%
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Table 5: Impact of Trade Liberalization and Domestic Production Subsidy Reforms 
on Sugar Production and Consumption for Selected Countries (continued)
 
 